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THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE:
ALIVE AND WELL
Jason Iuliano* & Keith E. Whittington**
The nondelegation doctrine is dead. It is difficult to think of a more frequently repeated or
widely accepted legal conclusion. For generations, scholars have maintained that the doctrine
was cast aside by the New Deal Court and is now nothing more than a historical curiosity. In
this Article, we argue that the conventional wisdom is mistaken in an important respect.
Drawing on an original dataset of more than one thousand nondelegation challenges, we
find that, although the doctrine has disappeared at the federal level, it has thrived at the state
level. In fact, in the decades since the New Deal, state courts have grown more willing to invoke
the nondelegation doctrine. Despite the countless declarations of its demise, the nondelegation
doctrine is, in a meaningful sense, alive and well.
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INTRODUCTION
The story of the nondelegation doctrine’s demise is a familiar one.
Eighty years ago, the New Deal Court discarded this principle, and since
then, this once-powerful check on administrative expansion has had no place
in our constitutional canon. Although lawyers continue to invoke the doctrine—like mystics trying to raise the dead—their efforts inevitably prove
© 2017 Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington. Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Olin-Searle Fellow in Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
** William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University. We thank
Stephanos Bibas, Richard Epstein, Dan Ernst, Dan Kahan, Sophia Lee, Sandy Levinson,
and Richard Re for valuable comments and discussions relating to this project.
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futile. As Cynthia Farina colorfully noted, “If Academy Awards were given in
constitutional jurisprudence, nondelegation claims against regulatory statutes would win the prize for Most Sympathetic Judicial Rhetoric in a Hopeless Case.”1 Today, most scholars agree that the nondelegation doctrine is
nothing more than an artifact of history—perhaps curious to examine and
interesting to ponder, but of no import beyond the borders of academia.
In this Article, we question the scope of the doctrine’s death. Drawing
upon an original dataset of more than one thousand nondelegation cases, we
find that, despite the doctrine’s disappearance at the federal level, it has
become an increasingly important part of state constitutional law. Contrary
to the conventional wisdom, the nondelegation doctrine is alive and well,
albeit in a different location.
Through our analysis, we challenge a core aspect of what we have previously referred to as the myth of the nondelegation doctrine.2 There are two
distinct parts to this mythology. The first commemorates the doctrine’s life.
This part of the narrative maintains that the doctrine was once a robust and
important part of the pre–New Deal order. Across the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, it supposedly served as a powerful constraint on the exercise of political authority.
The second part of the nondelegation myth recounts the death of the
doctrine—placing its collapse in the late 1930s. The story goes that, alongside such rules as substantive due process and dual federalism, the nondelegation doctrine was cast into the “constitution in exile” during the judicial
revolution of 1937. What was a vibrant constitutional rule in the early twentieth century was banished from the constitutional landscape following the
New Deal. In a previous article, we showed that the first part of this myth is
wrong.3 In this Article, we show that the second part fails to capture an
important way in which the nondelegation doctrine has survived. Our argument proceeds as follows.
In Part I, we detail the myth of the nondelegation doctrine and present
the conventional wisdom regarding how the doctrine was cast into darkness
during the New Deal. In Part II, we test the empirical claims that follow from
this traditional narrative. In particular, we discuss the structure one would
expect to observe if the nondelegation doctrine were part of a constitutional
revolution. We then present findings from our database of nondelegation
cases to show that the doctrine does not fit this structure. Unlike the constitutional principles underlying dual federalism and economic substantive due
process, the pattern of litigation surrounding the nondelegation doctrine was
not affected by the New Deal revolution. Finally, in Part III, we detail the
types of nondelegation challenges that have arisen and been successful over
the past eighty years.
1 Cynthia R. Farina, Essay, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87,
87 (2010).
2 See generally Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (2017).
3 See id. at 417–29.
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NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

Read any article on the subject, and you will hear the same story:
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts aggressively
invoked the nondelegation doctrine to rein in excessive governmental
expansion.4 Then, following the New Deal, the doctrine lost its luster and
was relegated to the constitutional dustbin.5 In this Part, we briefly recap the
false story of the doctrine’s life and then shift focus to the mythology of its
death.
A.

The Doctrine’s Life

In The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, we examined state and federal
nondelegation challenges between 1789 and 1940.6 What we found was surprising. Contrary to accepted wisdom, this period was not marked by vigorous enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine. Instead, pragmatic
considerations dominated the era.7 When evaluating the merits of nondelegation challenges, judges tended to permit those delegations that were necessary to a well-functioning government—intervening only when the legislature
had ceded power that threatened to undermine the system of checks and
balances. To most courts, this principle meant that it was only appropriate to
strike down a statute on nondelegation grounds if the legislature had wholly
abdicated its responsibility to the public or shielded itself from electoral
accountability.8
4 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1233–41 (1994) (discussing the death of limited government and the death of the
nondelegation doctrine).
5 See id.
6 Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 2, at 383.
7 See id. at 409 (“[C]ourts generally took a pragmatic view of the situation and upheld
those delegations that they deemed necessary for the government to accomplish its
goals.”).
8 See id. at 411–12; see also State v. Denny, 21 N.E. 252, 258 (Ind. 1889) (finding a
legislative delegation unconstitutional because it granted a politically unaccountable board
“absolute and exclusive control over the construction of all sewers, the water supply, and
supply of lights, with no voice in the matter left to the people of the city”); State v. Frear,
125 N.W. 961, 966 (Wis. 1910) (upholding a legislative delegation to the voters on the
grounds that such a delegation would not cause “legislators [to] shirk [their] responsibility
and become cowardly and corrupt”). This interpretation of the nondelegation doctrine
has carried through to the present day. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 679 F.3d 397, 401
(6th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n administrative agency cannot be granted the power to issue legislative rules (unrelated to any adjudication) without having any political accountability and
without having to follow any procedure whatsoever.” (quoting Resentencing Order at 14,
United States v. Horn, 590 F. Supp. 2d 976 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (No. 3:01-00142)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 649 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Just
as the executive and judicial branches may not encroach on the power of Congress, Congress may not abdicate its responsibility to either of these two branches.”); Mich. Pork
Producers Ass’n v. Campaign for Family Farms, 174 F. Supp. 2d 637, 646 (W.D. Mich.
2001) (reading “the authorizations for delegation in the Act narrowly, consistent with the
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Despite this seemingly stringent hurdle, some nondelegation challenges
were successful. In fact, seventeen percent of all nondelegation cases
between 1789 and 1940 resulted in the invalidation of a state or federal statute.9 Although this success rate may seem impressive, the actual cases suggest that the nondelegation doctrine was not an overly restrictive constraint.
As we showed in our previous article, the legislative delegations that were
invalidated during this period generally conferred substantial discretion on
the delegate.10 Consider the following two cases that are representative of
successful nondelegation challenges of the time.
In Marr v. Enloe, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a statute that
granted unbridled taxing power to the county courts.11 In the challenged
law, the legislature failed to specify the rate of taxation or the distribution of
taxes upon different forms of property.12 The only instruction to the courts
was that they should assess taxes sufficient “to meet the current expenses of
their county for the ensuing year.”13 Alarmed by the scope of the delegation,
the Tennessee Supreme Court asked:
[W]hat limit to exactions is imposed by the act . . . ? We answer, none. [The
courts] may tax every acre in their respective counties to its full value, and if
the tax is not paid, cause the land to be sold and bought in by the sheriff . . .
if there be no other bidders.14

Due to the complete discretion allotted to the county judges, the court found
this statute to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.15
Another representative case is State v. Field.16 This nondelegation challenge centered on a Missouri statute that governed the maintenance of
roads. Of particular concern was a provision that gave county courts authority to suspend the operation of the law.17 Finding this portion of the statute
to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that “[i]t appears impossible to doubt, that the power
which has been exercised by the court . . . and which has the effect of deterprinciples of the non-delegation doctrine, for the purpose of preserving the Separation of
Powers and the political accountability intended by the Constitution”); Steen v. Appellate
Div., Superior Court, 331 P.3d 136, 145 (Cal. 2014) (emphasizing the importance of “maintaining clear lines of political accountability” during its evaluation of the constitutionality
of a delegation of legislative power).
9 For a detailed breakdown of invalidation rates, see Whittington & Iuliano, supra
note 2, at 426 tbl.4.
10 Id. at 413–14 (discussing representative invalidations).
11 Marr v. Enloe, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 452, 453 (1830) (delegating to courts the power to
set taxes “upon all polls and property subject to taxation by the laws of this State”).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 454.
15 Id. at 455 (“That the act of 1827 was passed by the legislature with good intentions
we do not doubt, but that it is unwise as well as unconstitutional, its execution in this
district has tested . . . .”).
16 17 Mo. 529 (1853).
17 See id. at 530.
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mining what law shall be in force in the tribunals of the state . . . is a part of
the legislative power which cannot be entrusted to the county courts.”18
We offer these cases as illustrations of the types of delegations that were
invalidated in the pre–New Deal era. If the same delegations were to occur
today, modern courts would invariably declare them unconstitutional. As we
concluded before: “If anything about the nondelegation doctrine’s history is
surprising, it is that legislatures once thought it appropriate to delegate such
expansive powers, not that courts saw fit to strike them down.”19
Contrary to the prevailing narrative, the nondelegation doctrine was not
an overly restrictive check on legislative delegations of power during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In reality, the courts adopted a
pragmatic approach. If the delegation was necessary to advance a governmental interest and did not substantially undermine the system of checks and
balances, then the delegation would withstand constitutional scrutiny. If,
however, the statute granted near absolute discretion to the delegate or
shielded the legislature from electoral accountability, then it would not withstand judicial review.
B.

The Doctrine’s Death

In one of the critical cases in the battle between the U.S. Supreme Court
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the progressive Justice Benjamin Cardozo shocked the administration by joining his conservative colleagues on
the Court in striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act, a centerpiece of the first New Deal.20 This scheme, which granted boards composed
of private actors and government officials the power to develop legally binding industrial codes, was—even Justice Cardozo thought—“delegation running riot.”21 According to conventional wisdom, this case (A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp.) and Panama Refining Co.22—both decided in 1935—marked the
high point of the nondelegation doctrine. A mere two years later, the story
goes, the doctrine no longer stood as an obstacle to legislative delegations.
Legal scholars view this shift in the nondelegation doctrine’s status as
part of a broader revolution that occurred during the New Deal.23 After
1937, the old Court and its constitutional verities passed into history, and the
18 Id. at 534.
19 Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 2, at 414.
20 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
21 Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
22 Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
23 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40–67 (1993) (discussing
“The Revolution of 1937”). Although legal scholars generally accept that the New Deal
marked a revolutionary era, historians have debated this point. Compare CARL N. DEGLER,
OUT OF OUR PAST: THE FORCES THAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA 412–50 (1959) (commenting on the “revolutionary” nature of the New Deal), with Barton J. Bernstein, The New Deal:
The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform, in TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 263, 264 (Barton J. Bernstein ed., 1968) (arguing that “[t]he liberal
reforms of the New Deal did not transform the American system”).
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New Dealers rewrote the constitutional rules to accommodate novel uses of
state power.24 Constitutional fetters that had made it difficult for the
national government to regulate economic actors and adopt social policy, for
the states to restrict property in the name of the public good, and for executive officials to make and implement desired public policy were removed.
The venerable nondelegation doctrine is widely considered one of the primary casualties of that tumultuous period.25 As Martin Flaherty has
observed, “[w]ith the New Deal” came the “death of the nondelegation
doctrine.”26
Most legal scholars accept this narrative and maintain that the doctrine
remains lifeless to this day.27 As then-professor Elena Kagan wrote, “It is,
after all, a commonplace that the nondelegation doctrine is no doctrine at
all.”28 Matthew Stephenson has noted that “the nondelegation doctrine . . .
is basically a dead letter.”29 And Matthew Adler has similarly observed that
“we live in a constitutional world where the nondelegation doctrine remains
dead.”30 Other scholars went even further, calling the doctrine “a constitu24 See, e.g., Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint,
39 MICH. L. REV. 213, 236 (1940) (characterizing the period following 1937 as “laissez-faire
for legislatures” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 329 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (“As the leading
American authority on administrative law points out, however, even in 1932 the lack of
power to delegate was unclear, and shortly thereafter ‘the nondelegation doctrine died
gradually and the rise of legislative rules came during its dying period.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:9, at 44 (2d
ed. 1979))); Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship
Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 938 (2006) (“As
demonstrated by the past seven decades of case law, the nondelegation doctrine has
become virtually unenforceable.”).
26 Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1820 (1996). At
least one notable scholar had already declared the death of the nondelegation doctrine by
the time of the New Deal. See Elihu Root, Public Service by the Bar, in ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP BY ELIHU ROOT 519, 535 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds.,
1916) (announcing, in 1916, that “the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative
power has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight”).
27 See Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L.
REV. 765, 780 (2016) (noting that “conventional wisdom holds that the nondelegation doctrine is dead, or at least unenforceable” (footnote omitted)); Alexander Volokh, The New
Private Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 974 (2014) (observing “the widespread perception that [the] nondelegation doctrine is mostly dead”). Even some judges have adopted this view. See, e.g.,
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The vitality of the
nondelegation doctrine is questionable . . . .”); Massachusetts v. Simon, Nos. 75-0129, 750130, 1975 WL 3636, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1975) (“The non-delegation doctrine is almost
a complete failure.”).
28 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001).
29 Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 145 (2005).
30 Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 839 (1997).
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tional lost cause”31 that has the potential to “do more harm than good to [ ]
clients’ interests.”32 Even those who were unwilling to pronounce the
nondelegation doctrine’s death conceded that it appeared to be “on life support, with the Supreme Court neither willing to pull the plug nor prepared
to revive it.”33 The academic consensus was clear: following the New Deal,
this once vital constitutional principle had, in essence, become a “nondoctrine.”34
Accordingly, few believe that a constitutional challenge based on
nondelegation could expect to win in the current era.35 Although modern
conservative justices still discuss the nondelegation doctrine in dissenting or
concurring opinions, even they seem to acknowledge that their hopes of
reviving the doctrine are more fanciful than realistic.36 As Mark Tushnet
noted, “No revolutionary return to the past seems likely.”37 With the end of
the New Deal revolution, so too came the end of the nondelegation doctrine.
Although this dour view of the doctrine dominates the constitutional
discourse, a few scholars have adopted less pessimistic stances.38 Notably,
however, these scholars still accept that the doctrine, as a standalone mechanism of enforcement, is dead. Their optimism stems not from a belief in the
viability of nondelegation challenges today, but rather from a belief that the
doctrine has affected other judicial principles.
Cass Sunstein—a prominent member of this group—argues that the
nondelegation doctrine has influenced certain canons of constitutional construction. He believes that the doctrine “has been relocated rather than
31 Farina, supra note 1, at 88.
32 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 55 (1960).
33 Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV.
1035, 1038 (2007); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002) (maintaining that the doctrine exists in an
“undead state”).
34 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 33, at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 943 (2000) (“Since the New Deal, the
nondelegation doctrine has been, for all practical purposes, a dead letter.”). But see Jim
Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in
the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1193–97 (1999) (discussing successful nondelegation challenges in “‘Strong’ Nondelegation States”).
36 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the relationship between a functioning nondelegation doctrine
and the constitutional separation of powers); id. at 1241–45 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (same); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 548 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672–74
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
37 MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 66 (2003).
38 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 419 (2008) (arguing that “it would be a mistake to say that the nondelegation doctrine is dead”).
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abandoned.”39 According to Sunstein, “Federal courts commonly vindicate
not a general nondelegation doctrine, but a series of more specific and
smaller, though quite important, nondelegation doctrines.”40 Endorsing a
similar position, John Manning argues that the nondelegation doctrine “now
operates exclusively through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of
serious constitutional questions.”41 Like Sunstein and Manning, we too are
nondelegation optimists. Our view, however, is quite distinct from theirs.
We argue that the doctrine itself is still viable.42
There is a straightforward explanation for why the academic consensus
is mistaken on this point. Thus far, the literature on the nondelegation doctrine has focused almost exclusively on Supreme Court cases. By restricting
the analysis in this manner, all but a few scholars have failed to account for
the diverse set of nearly ten thousand nondelegation cases that have arisen in
the state and lower federal courts.43 It is these cases—not the handful heard
in the Supreme Court—that tell the true story. By analyzing an original
dataset of state and lower federal court cases, we are able to offer a better,
more developed understanding of the nondelegation doctrine. As we show
in the remainder of this Article, the empirical evidence suggests that the
nondelegation doctrine not only survived the New Deal revolution, but has
thrived in the eighty years since.
II. THE STRUCTURE

OF A

CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

The New Deal seemed to exemplify, for many contemporary and subsequent commentators, something entirely new—a constitutional revolution.
The great constitutional scholar—and Franklin Roosevelt advisor—Edward
Corwin set the tone early in a much-discussed set of lectures titled simply,
“Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.”44 For Corwin, the “switch in time” on the
Court in 1937 marked both the death of the laissez-faire theory of government constitutionalized in the Gilded Age by lawyers such as Thomas Cooley
and Christopher Tiedeman and the birth of a New Deal constitutional order
that embraced concentrated political power and active governmental responsibilities. Unsurprisingly, in the immediate aftermath of 1937, Corwin and
39 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000).
40 Id. at 316.
41 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 223. But see David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New
Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002) (arguing “that the nondelegation
doctrine has played little or no role in statutory construction”).
42 See infra notes 68–120 and accompanying text.
43 Indeed, the small number of scholars who have looked at state nondelegation cases
have observed that the doctrine may have continued vitality at the state level. See, e.g., Gary
J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 567, 578–601 (1994) (analyzing the different standards that state courts use when
considering nondelegation challenges); Rossi, supra note 35, at 1191–1201 (dividing states
into “weak,” “strong,” and “moderate” enforcers of the nondelegation doctrine).
44 EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL204.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 9

28-DEC-17

the nondelegation doctrine: alive and well

10:20

627

others thought that what the Court had primarily accomplished was “selfabnegation” and the sweeping away of “certain legal obstacles to effective
action.”45 The “judicial revolution of 1937” had placed firmly in congressional hands the power to take action in the national interest and had dismantled “impediments in the way of the democratic process” that had
previously tied the hands of legislative majorities.46
While this conclusion regarding what the New Deal revolution ushered
onto the constitutional stage would require modification after a few more
years, there was little question that contemporaries in the 1930s were witnessing the “dissolution of traditional concepts of power.”47 As the constitutional
views of Justice Stephen Field were discarded and those of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes were embraced, observers marveled that “[p]erhaps never
in the history of the Court has there been such a period as that since 1937 for
the modification or reversal of the results of predecessors’ wisdom.”48 The
Court might have needed to emphasize the point after 1937, for as the constitutional historian Robert McCloskey put it, “sometimes a coup de grace is
necessary to convince both executioners and observers that the condemned
is well and truly dead.”49 By the start of World War II, it was “apparent
beyond question that the turnabout was complete, that the constitutional
future belonged to men like Stone, that not even a remnant remained for
men like McReynolds.”50 A new constitution was being written, and an old
one was being discarded. It was a “new constitutional era.”51
Subsequent scholars have largely reaffirmed that initial reading of
events.52 The New Deal historian William Leuchtenburg has recounted how
the “traditional doctrines of the Supreme Court” came under challenge,
“precipitated a constitutional crisis, and, in the end, resulted in nothing less
than a ‘Constitutional Revolution.’”53 A “new constitutional order” was
45 Elias Huzar, Book Review, 27 CORNELL L. REV. 152, 154 (1941) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (reviewing CORWIN, supra note 44). See generally David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55
MO. L. REV. 93 (1990).
46 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 59 HARV.
L. REV. 883, 947 (1946).
47 Percy Thomas Fenn, Jr., Book Review, 55 HARV. L. REV. 307, 309 (1941) (reviewing
CORWIN, supra note 44, and ERIK MCKINLEY ERIKSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEW
DEAL (1940)).
48 Barnett, supra note 24, at 236.
49 Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii (1967).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 For two notable exceptions, see generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (challenging the
conventional account that the New Deal era marked a “constitutional revolution”); G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000) (same).
53 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 214 (1995).
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established over the course of Franklin Roosevelt’s second term of office.54
The New Deal period ushered in a new constitutional “regime” that separated what came after from what had come before as decisively as the adoption of the U.S. Constitution itself had done.55
But how should we recognize a constitutional revolution? Observers
seemed united in thinking that they had experienced one in the late 1930s,
but that is of limited assistance in determining whether one has really taken
place—and of more immediate relevance, determining whether it incorporates a particular area of law. In order to determine whether the nondelegation doctrine was caught up in the constitutional revolution of 1937, it would
be useful to characterize the structure of this phenomenon.
For present purposes, the descriptive features of a constitutional revolution are of primary interest. Bruce Ackerman’s account of the transition
from one constitutional regime to another through an act of extraordinary
higher lawmaking, for example, is only partly descriptive.56 There is an
important normative (or normative-interpretive) component to the theory
that is concerned with outlining the procedure by which higher lawmaking
should occur and how legal interpreters might recognize legitimate constitutional change. If the Constitution is being changed through unconventional
means, we need a rule of recognition to distinguish authoritative change in
the law from mere error.57 Ackerman suggests a four-part sequence of signals, proposals, deliberation, and institutionalization.58
A political movement that has managed to pass through those phases of
the higher lawmaking process can expect constitutional interpreters both to
recognize that new constitutional rules have been authoritatively adopted
and to implement them accordingly. While Ackerman believes this model of
constitutional change is roughly characteristic of the American experience,
its primary purpose is to establish a normative framework roughly analogous
to Article V for channeling pressures for constitutional reform. Others have
focused on the explanations for constitutional change, examining, for example, whether the New Deal revolution is best accounted for by internal (e.g.,
legal and intellectual considerations) or external (e.g., political pressure) factors.59 The existence of a constitutional revolution itself is taken as a given.
Here, we tackle this fundamental issue and seek to identify the key characteristics of a constitutional revolution.

54 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE
NEW LEGALITY 1932–1968, at 115 (1970).
55 Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 488
(1989).
56 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991) (describing
the concept of “higher lawmaking”).
57 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–09 (3d ed. 2012).
58 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 290–91.
59 See CUSHMAN, supra note 52.
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Revolutions in constitutional law are best thought of as a kind of Kuhnian paradigm shift.60 Thomas Kuhn argued that science develops not only
through gradual evolutionary gains but also through sudden revolutionary
leaps.61 Scientific revolutions cast off old theories, conceptual apparatuses,
hypotheses, ways of working, and investigatory agendas. “Normal” science
proceeds on the basis of those conceptual assumptions, working within the
confines of the established framework and applying and elaborating its basic
insights and commitments. Similarly, normal constitutional adjudication is
concerned with elaborating and applying inherited rules and principles. Stability and continuity are its hallmarks. By contrast, revolution encompasses
“the abrupt, precipitous transformations of American constitutional law.”62
The paradigms established during those revolutions provide “a complex set
of instructions for conceptualizing and adjudicating constitutional controversies under a particular constitutional provision.”63
At the heart of a constitutional revolution is discontinuity. It is transformative of the normal state of affairs. The old ways are abandoned and
replaced with something different. Of immediate relevance is the abandonment of the old ways. This process occurred when “the Supreme Court suddenly and substantially reversed its position in the cases decided in the spring
of 1937.”64 The revolution of 1937 overthrew the constitutional order that
had been built during the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. Well-established doctrines were buried. Old law was overruled.
Constitutional claims that were once common and successful became rare
and fruitless.
This description implies two observable patterns about what happens to
an established constitutional doctrine that passes through a revolution. First,
the rate of success in raising a given constitutional claim in court should
decline precipitously. Even when a given constitutional rule is vibrant, it will
not always meet with success. Nonetheless, courts will regularly invoke that
rule to enforce constitutional limits against deviating government officials.
After a constitutional revolution, however, courts should oppose such constitutional claims, and their success rate should plummet. The number of successful cases might not drop to zero—given both the possibility of outlier
judges who continue to adhere to the old constitutional sensibilities and renegade legislatures who might push the boundaries of even the newly relaxed
jurisprudential regime—but constitutional claimants should find their argumentative burden to be substantially heavier after the revolution.
60 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92–110 (4th ed.
2012) (developing the concept of “paradigm shifts”).
61 See id.
62 ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE ROLE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 15 (2000).
63 Id. at 134.
64 CUSHMAN, supra note 52, at 5. Cushman takes issue with a key component of this
descriptive account of the New Deal revolution, arguing that, though decisive, the change
was more gradual and less sudden than conventional wisdom would hold. See id.
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The constitutional revolution of 1937 was wide-ranging, but it is universally recognized that a key feature of that transformation was the abandonment of what the New Dealers derided as “substantive due process”—the
protection of substantive property rights against legislatures through the due
process clause.65 If substantive due process and its principle of “liberty of
contract” were not completely dead after 1937, legislatures were certainly
given a much freer hand in determining how far private property interests
should give way to the legislature’s own judgment of what was in the interest
of the community as a whole.
Figure 1 illustrates this expectation about the transformation of the
number of successful constitutional claims across a constitutional revolution
and shows how the actual pattern of economic due process challenges conformed to this broad pattern. Litigants hoping to invoke that traditional constitutional rule had a reasonable prospect of success before 1937, and only a
minimal prospect of success afterwards.
FIGURE 1: NUMBER
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A second observable implication for adjudication across a constitutional
revolution is that there should be a substantial drop in the volume of such
cases in the postrevolutionary period. When courts are amenable to invoking
a given constitutional claim, litigants are incentivized to bring that claim forward. A live doctrine should be visible through a steady stream of litigation
that requires the courts to elaborate on the existing rule.
As the prospects for success decline, however, litigants will soon learn
that it is not worth the effort of even raising the challenge, and these types of
claims should largely disappear from the judicial docket. Cases involving the
65

See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 53, at 178; WRIGHT, supra note 49, at 215–17.
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now-defunct constitutional rule are unlikely to vanish immediately, however,
since it will require some time for existing cases to clear the judicial pipeline
and for potential litigants to learn that bringing new cases will be fruitless.
Moreover, judges will need to continue to discuss the issue for some period
of time simply in order to announce and clarify the new status of the traditional constitutional rule.
Figure 2 illustrates this dynamic in the specific case of economic due
process claims in federal courts. Once again, the flow of cases raising constitutional challenges to legislation based on arguments that economic regulations interfered with rights of property protected by the Due Process Clause
was reduced to a trickle after the revolution of 1937.
FIGURE 2: ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS CASES, 1920–1970
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This graph depicts a paradigmatic example of a constitutional revolution. The reversal of the Lochner66 line of cases in New Deal decisions like
West Coast Hotel67 and Carolene Products68 created a sharp discontinuity in the
development of American constitutional law. Constitutional challenges that
were successful before the switch in time ceased to be so afterwards. Constitutional issues that were regularly heard and resolved by the courts disappeared from the judicial docket.
The nondelegation doctrine did not follow this pattern. Indeed, there is
little in the history of the nondelegation doctrine over the twentieth century
that would suggest the existence of a New Deal constitutional revolution at
all. This is not to call into question whether there was a New Deal revolution
in constitutional law, but rather to call into question whether the nondelega66
67
68

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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tion doctrine was a part of it. The evidence suggests that the principle of
nondelegation of legislative power was largely unaffected by the events of the
1930s. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the doctrine was not cast into exile.
It continued to play a role in American constitutional law no different from
the one it had played before the New Deal.
FIGURE 3: NUMBER
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The pattern of constitutional nondelegation cases over the course of the
twentieth century does not match the expected pattern for either constitutional invalidations or volume of litigation. Figure 3 shows the number of
successful nondelegation challenges in state and federal cases decided during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The graph reports a sample in which cases were identified and coded in five-year intervals, with a
trend line superimposed over the raw data. A vertical line demarcates 1937,
the year after which we should expect to observe a strong downward trend if
the nondelegation doctrine were part of the New Deal revolution. As the
data show, no such trend exists.
Whereas Figure 1 depicted a pattern consistent with a constitutional
revolution—a sharp discontinuity, with a period of relatively successful claims
followed by a period of limited success for economic due process claims—
Figure 3 shows that successful nondelegation challenges have occurred at
comparable levels throughout the last century.
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The volume of constitutional adjudication involving nondelegation challenges in the twentieth century tells a similar story. Figure 4 reports on the
same sample taken at five-year intervals, but here the focus is on the absolute
number of cases. As we saw, Figure 2 suggested that frustrated litigants
stopped trying to raise economic due process challenges in the courts following the successful constitutional revolution. Here, however, Figure 4 shows
that nondelegation cases were just as common—if not more so—after the
New Deal as they had been before. Again, a vertical line marks 1937. The
data show that the number of nondelegation cases continued rising after that
point for more than forty years.
The relative spike of such cases in 1980 and dearth of such cases in 2010
creates an apparent downward slide in the nondelegation doctrine in the
twenty-first century, but it is too soon to reach any firm conclusions about the
future of such litigation. That said, Figure 5 provides one reason to be optimistic about the doctrine’s prospects. As the graph shows, the success rate
has remained markedly stable over the past century. Setting aside three outliers (1900, 1935, and 2010), the success rates fall within a rather narrow
range. Although the future of the doctrine is yet to be written, one aspect of
its past is certain: the nondelegation doctrine not only survived the New Deal
era, but increased in strength for decades after.
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One concern we must address is that the volume of nondelegation challenges might be affected by larger tendencies in the judicial caseload over
such a long time period. It is possible that the pattern observed among
nondelegation cases is swamped by the overall growth in the judicial docket.
A comparison with the economic substantive due process claims, however,
suggests that this is not the case. If there were any broader environmental
factors that buoyed the nondelegation cases across the twentieth century,
they had no similar effect on economic due process cases. The number of
cases raising these challenges simply diverged after the 1930s, with nondelegation cases persisting and due process cases falling into desuetude. The
true story of the nondelegation doctrine is one of stability and continuity, not
one of instability and discontinuity.
III. THE PERSISTENCE

OF THE

NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

The nondelegation doctrine is one of the most extensively studied topics
in constitutional law.69 Despite this, nearly all research on the subject has
focused on the small number of Supreme Court decisions that address the
doctrine. Scholars rarely venture more than a few words about nondelegation cases in state or lower federal courts.70 Notably, the lack of work in this
area has neither stopped researchers from proclaiming the death of the
69 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1721 (calling the nondelegation doctrine
“[o]ne of the most exhaustively analyzed topics in public law”); see also Lemos, supra note
38, at 405 (“The nondelegation doctrine is the subject of a vast and ever-expanding body of
scholarship.”).
70 For notable exceptions, see Greco, supra note 43; Rossi, supra note 35; Volokh,
supra note 27, at 963–70.
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nondelegation doctrine71 nor dissuaded them from asserting that the doctrine has experienced “nearly two hundred years of rejection by the courts
and political branches.”72 Quite simply, the Supreme Court has been the
beginning and the end of most legal inquiry into the nondelegation
doctrine.
Although unfortunate, this exclusive focus on the high court is part of a
much broader problem in legal scholarship. As Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have observed, “constitutional law is much too centered on the opinions
of the Supreme Court of the United States.”73 Likewise, when discussing the
issue of statutory interpretation, Aaron-Andrew Bruhl argued that researchers’ “preoccupation with the Supreme Court [leaves them] ill-equipped to
answer [many] questions.”74 Increasingly, scholars have begun to emphasize
the need to “look beyond the Supreme Court” in order to fully understand
how the law operates.75 In this Part, we take that step with respect to the
nondelegation doctrine.
A.

Success Rate

Our dataset consists of all state and federal nondelegation cases between
1940 and 2015 that were decided in a year divisible by five (i.e., 1940, 1945,
1950 . . . 2015).76 By drawing data at five-year intervals, we were able to
obtain a representative sample of nondelegation cases in the post–New Deal
era. Given the large number of nondelegation cases, we believe this protocol
represents the best tradeoff between descriptive power and the resources
needed to collect the data.
71 See supra Section I.B.
72 Farina, supra note 1, at 89 (footnote omitted).
73 J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV.
963, 970, 1002–06 (1998).
74 See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 437 (2012).
75 See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, Frenemies of the Court: The Many Faces of Amicus Curiae, 49
U. RICH. L. REV. 361, 363 (2015) (noting that the Supreme Court has been “the focus of
most scholarly writing on amicus curiae” and emphasizing the need to examine the lower
courts to better understand this topic); Bruhl, supra note 74, at 437; Randy J. Kozel, The
Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 185 (2014) (looking “beyond the Supreme Court
to explain how debates over the scope of precedent depend on the unique structural characteristics of the courts that issue decisions and the courts that apply them”); Jonathan
Remy Nash, Expertise and Opinion Assignment on the Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1599, 1605 (2014) (noting “the almost complete failure of scholars to
look beyond the Supreme Court” and arguing that doing so can deepen our understanding of opinion assignment).
76 In order to identify nondelegation cases, we conducted the following search on
Westlaw for all state and federal cases in the relevant years: “TO(‘delegation #of powers’)
or (delegat! /2 legislative /1 (power! or authority)) or (delegat! /2 lawmaking /1 (power!
or authority)).” We then examined each search result to see if the case involved a nondelegation challenge.
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In total, our sample included 1075 nondelegation cases. Of these, 156
(15%) resulted in the invalidation of a statute on nondelegation grounds. A
large majority of the nondelegation cases (85%) took place in state courts.
State courts were also more likely to rule that a statute violated the nondelegation doctrine (16% to 3%). Given the Supreme Court’s unreceptiveness to
nondelegation claims, this federal-state divide is unsurprising.77 Table 1 provides a more complete look at the success rate of nondelegation challenges.
TABLE 1: NONDELEGATION SUCCESS RATE, 1940–2015

Nondelegation Cases
Successful Challenges
Invalidation Rate

State

Federal

Total

919
151
16%

156
5*
3%

1075
156
15%

* Four of these cases were reversed on appeal.

Thus far, three points stand out. First, there was a substantial number of
nondelegation cases over this period. On average, sixty-seven cases arose
each year. Assuming our sample is representative, state and federal courts
heard more than five thousand nondelegation challenges between 1940 and
2015. For a living doctrine, that is a noteworthy figure. But for one that is
allegedly dead, that number is all the more impressive.
The second notable item is the sheer number of successful challenges.
Since the end of the New Deal, courts have used the nondelegation doctrine
to invalidate approximately 750 statutes (about ten a year). That may not
sound like a substantial figure at first, but if you consider what the number
represents, it is rather remarkable. Every year, ten statutes that have been
duly enacted by a legislature and signed by a chief executive are held to be
unconstitutional violations of the nondelegation doctrine. If the doctrine
has, indeed, been dead all these years, that number is very hard to explain.
Perhaps even more impressive than the absolute number of cases is the
fact that a full fifteen percent of all nondelegation challenges are successful.
This rate is very close to the seventeen percent success rate for nondelegation
cases between 1789 and 1939. Given that this earlier period is considered the
high point of nondelegation enforcement, the lack of a meaningful—or even
statistically significant78—difference in success is striking.79 Notably, this rate
77 This disparity is also explained in part by the fact that some “states’ non-delegation
doctrines are stricter than the federal one.” Volokh, supra note 27, at 964.
78 The chi-square statistic is 2.6777, and the p-value is 0.101759. This result is not
significant at the conventional levels of significance (p < 0.05 or p < 0.01).
79 Because we focus on the success rate as an indicator of the nondelegation doctrine’s
vitality, it is worth discussing the Priest-Klein hypothesis and why their account of litigation
does not undermine our findings. The Priest-Klein hypothesis’s central claim is that one
cannot extrapolate from a legal doctrine’s success rate to the vitality of that doctrine. See
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984). They argue that, due to the possibility of settlement, plaintiff success rates trend
toward a fixed rate which is “unrelated to the position of the decision standard or to the
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is also in line with many other types of constitutional challenges and is even
far higher than the success rates of some doctrines that are considered alive
and well today.
As one point of comparison, the success rate for all constitutional
challenges in the Supreme Court between 1940 and 2015 was twenty
percent—not that far above the overall nondelegation success rate.80
Admittedly, very few nondelegation cases took place in the Supreme Court—
and of those that did, none were successful—so this is not the most
comparable statistic. That said, data regarding the success rate of
constitutional challenges in state courts tells a similar story.
In a study of state supreme court decisions between 1995 and 1998,
Melinda Gann Hall found that constitutional challenges were successful
about twenty percent of the time.81 Simply stating the average, however,
obscures the variations between the states. In a handful of states,
constitutional challenges were never successful,82 and in others,
constitutional challenges were successful more than one-third of the time.83
In a more recent study of judicial review in state courts, Keith Whittington
found that the invalidation rate during the New Deal period was
approximately twenty-five percent.84 With a success rate of fifteen percent,
nondelegation challenges fall squarely within the standard range.
The data on specific constitutional challenges provides further evidence
of the nondelegation doctrine’s vitality. Consider, for example, Fourth
Amendment constitutional challenges in criminal cases. The success rate for
shape of the distribution of disputes.” Id. at 19. Although this hypothesis provides reason
to be measured in our comparisons with other legal doctrines, we believe its argument
does not apply to nondelegation challenges themselves. A fundamental assumption of the
Priest-Klein hypothesis is that the parties have the option to settle their dispute outside the
litigation process. Nondelegation challenges, however, are not conducive to such
settlements. Unlike most cases which have a continuum of outcomes (e.g., in civil cases
where monetary awards are possible or in criminal cases where plea bargains are possible),
nondelegation cases have only two potential resolutions. Either the legislative delegation is
upheld or it is found unconstitutional. For this reason, the parties are unable to reach a
mutually agreeable settlement. Therefore, in the absence of settlement alternatives, the
observed rate of success for a legal doctrine is indicative of that doctrine’s vitality and
accordingly not subject to the concern advanced by Priest and Klein.
80 See Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2015 Supreme Court Database, Version 2015 Release 01,
http://Supremecourtdatabase.org.
81 See Melinda Gann Hall, State Courts: Politics and the Judicial Process, in POLITICS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 251, 274 (Virginia Gray, Russell L. Hanson &
Thad Kousser eds., 2013) (illustrating the success rate at each state supreme court
graphically).
82 See id. at 273 (“[C]ourts of last resort in some states are not likely to engage in
constitutional conflicts. Particularly notable are Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, and
Michigan, which did not invalidate any actions on constitutional grounds.”).
83 See id. (finding that “eleven supreme courts are active players in the game of checks
and balances by invalidating in at least one of every three opportunities”).
84 Keith E. Whittington, State Constitutional Law in the New Deal Period, 67 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 1141, 1153 (2015).
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these claims is ten percent.85 Despite falling below the nondelegation
doctrine in terms of success, the Fourth Amendment is still considered a
relevant part of the Constitution. No scholars have declared the death of the
search and seizure provisions; nor have they urged lawyers to refrain from
advancing such claims for fear that doing so will damage clients’ cases.
Likewise, although First Amendment religious accommodation claims
against public education requirements succeed less than ten percent of the
time,86 no one argues that the Free Exercise Clause has been written out of
the Constitution and that any claims based on it are dead on arrival.
Numerous other examples abound.87 To give just one more, the success rate
for habeas claims is approximately five percent in state cases and less than
one percent in federal cases.88 Nonetheless, many scholars continue to view
this writ as a central protection for prisoners.89
Compared with these constitutional provisions, the nondelegation
doctrine has fared well. Nondelegation challenges may not be unusually
likely to succeed,90 but neither are they unusually likely to fail.91 They are
rather ordinary in their level of success, but that, in itself, is quite
85 Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 426 (2012) (reviewing federal
appellate cases decided between 2005 and 2009 and finding that Fourth Amendment
criminal constitutional challenges failed ninety percent of the time).
86 Lewis M. Wasserman, Overcoming Obstacles to Religious Exercise in K-12 Education, 40 J.
LEGIS. 96, 133–34 (2013–2014).
87 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the
Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 523 (1989) (noting that “[n]onprisoner
constitutional tort plaintiffs win only 9 percent of district court judgments, and prisoner
constitutional tort plaintiffs win less than 1 percent of judgments”); Robert C. Farrell,
Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v.
Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 370 (1999) (between 1971 and 1996, plaintiffs whose rational
basis equal protection claims were reviewed by the Supreme Court were successful a mere
nine percent of the time).
88 Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2006); see also Kathleen M.
Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to
Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43, 73 (1998) (“The success rate for all state
habeas petitions filed in the four states represented in the study was just under five
percent; for federal claims, the overall success rate was less than one percent.” (footnote
omitted)).
89 See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 89–91 (2012) (arguing that habeas claims are important in
safeguarding the constitutional rights of prisoners).
90 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 809 (finding that First Amendment
challenges in the Courts of Appeals that involve intermediate scrutiny are successful
twenty-seven percent of the time); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects
of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1172–73 (1991)
(reviewing cases decided between 1976 and 1988 and concluding that the success rate for
equal protection challenges was approximately forty percent during that period); Michelle
M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative Compensation for Medical Injury:
Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 87 (2008) (finding that
twenty-seven percent of constitutional challenges to malpractice reforms are successful).
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extraordinary. Combined, all of this evidence provides strong support for
our argument that the nondelegation doctrine did not undergo a substantive
change during the New Deal.
B.

Pre– and Post–New Deal Comparison

In this Section, we compare pre– and post–New Deal nondelegation
cases along a number of dimensions. As part of our analysis, we look at the
types of powers delegated, the entities to whom the powers were delegated,
and the kinds of support that judges relied upon in their opinions. The
post–New Deal cases come from this Article’s dataset and cover the
timeframe from 1940 through 2015. The pre–New Deal data draw upon
cases we collected for an earlier paper and cover the timeframe from 1789 to
1939.92 As we will show, the comparability between these two periods further
suggests that the New Deal did not represent a break in nondelegation
jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most similar aspect of nondelegation cases in the two eras is
the type of power that legislatures sought to delegate. After reviewing
thousands of cases, we identified four main categories of delegated power:
regulation,93 taxation,94 spending,95 and other.96 As Table 2 shows, the two
91 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821,
830–32 (2005) (discussing the success rate of various constitutional challenges heard by
the Supreme Court).
92 See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 2, at 418.
93 See, e.g., Lamberty v. State, No. 232, 2014, 2015 WL 428581, at *3 (Del. Jan. 30,
2015) (holding that a statute requiring sex offenders to register at locations designated by
the Superintendent of the State Police did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power); Clarke v. Morgan, 327 So. 2d 769, 770–74 (Fla. 1975) (finding that a
state statute empowering the city of Tampa to grant zoning variances is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); City of Oklahoma City v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of
Labor, 918 P.2d 26, 29–30 (Okla. 1995) (ruling that a state statute that tied the prevailing
wage rate to the U.S. Department of Labor was an unconstitutional violation of the
nondelegation doctrine).
94 See, e.g., Assessors of Haverhill v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 N.E.2d 917, 920
(Mass. 1955) (upholding a delegation to the local commissioner of the power to fix property value for purposes of taxation); Meyersdale Borough Refuse Serv. v. Wentworth, 36 Pa.
D. & C.3d 654, 658 (Ct. C.P. 1985) (holding that “the discretion given the borough’s solid
waste enforcement officer to set rates for garbage collection different from those established by the borough council is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority”).
95 See, e.g., McCall v. State, 654 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding that a statute
postponing payment of supplemental pension benefits from public employee retirement
systems fund in event of litigation challenging related statutory amendment was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private citizens); McGee Guest Home, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. of Wash., 12 P.3d 144, 150 (Wash. 2000) (upholding a statute
that delegated to the Department of Social and Health Services the power to determine
the amount which the state would reimburse assisted living facilities for their services).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that a
statute delegating authority to designate organizations as foreign terrorist organizations to
the Secretary of State is not an unconstitutional delegation of power); Sims v. State, 754 So.
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periods are remarkably consistent along this dimension. Both the spending
and other categories are identical—staying at seven percent and twenty-five
percent, respectively. The remaining categories—regulation and taxation—
exhibited only a small degree of variation, with the former increasing from
fifty-two percent to fifty-eight percent and the latter decreasing from sixteen
percent to eleven percent.
TABLE 2: TYPE

Post–New Deal
Pre–New Deal

OF

POWER DELEGATED

Regulation

Taxation

Spending

Other

58%
52%

11%
16%

7%
7%

25%
25%

Not only are the types of powers delegated the same, but also, as Table 3
shows, the political actors to whom power is delegated are broadly similar.
Three of the objects of delegation—the chief executive,97 the judiciary,98
and other99—were within five percentage points. Two larger changes are the

2d 657, 668–70 (Fla. 2000) (upholding statute delegating to Department of Corrections
the power to establish drug protocols for lethal injection); City of Auburndale v. Adams
Packing Ass’n, 171 So. 2d 161, 164–66 (Fla. 1965) (holding unconstitutional, on nondelegation grounds, a statute that gave courts the power to determine whether land may be
annexed by a municipality).
97 See, e.g., Dorst v. Pataki, 633 N.Y.S.2d 730, 736–37 (App. Div. 1995) (finding that a
statute delegating to the governor the power to exclude inmates from eligibility for a
temporary release program is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
98 See, e.g., In re Dailey, 465 S.E.2d 601, 610–11 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that statute
granting courts the authority to issue concealed carry permits was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power).
99 “Other” is a catch-all category that includes such delegates as private parties. See,
e.g., Gumbhir v. Kan. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 618 P.2d 837, 840–43 (Kan. 1980) (holding
that a statute that restricted the licensing of pharmacists to those who had graduated from
schools of pharmacy accredited by a private association was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power); Associated Builders & Contractors, Saginaw Valley Area Chapter v.
Dir., Dep’t of Consumer & Indus. Servs., 705 N.W.2d 509, 512–14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that a statute did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to private
parties by requiring the Department of Labor to use union rates when setting the
prevailing wage rate); State v. Self, 706 P.2d 975, 979–80 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding
an Oregon statute that made individuals criminally liable for conspiracy to commit crimes
in another state even if the crime was not illegal in Oregon). The “other” category also
includes state delegations to the federal government. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
of New Haven v. Connelly, 115 A.2d 455, 459–60 (Conn. 1955) (upholding a Connecticut
law that defines gross income, exemptions, and deductions according to federal corporate
tax provisions).
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decrease in delegations to local government100 (25% to 11%) and the
decrease in delegations to voters101 (11% to 3%).
TABLE 3: OBJECTS

Post–New Deal
Pre–New Deal

Executive
3%
5%

Agency
62%
38%

OF

DELEGATION

Judiciary
9%
13%

Local Gov’t
11%
25%

Voters
3%
11%

Other
13%
10%

The explanation for these shifts has to do with a broader trend in
government. Specifically, with the rise of the administrative state, legislatures
took to delegating authority horizontally (e.g., to executive agencies) rather
than vertically (e.g., to lower levels of government or to the voters). Indeed,
this point is reinforced by the largest change in Table 3—the increase in
delegations to agencies102 (38% to 62%). This disparity, although sizable,
should not be taken to suggest that a nondelegation revolution occurred
during the New Deal. Upon closer inspection, we found that the change
actually occurred much earlier in time. The lower pre–New Deal percentage
is simply being influenced by the absence of agency delegations in the early
nineteenth century. If we limit the period to 1880 through 1939, the
percentage of delegations to agencies rises to fifty-two percent—a number
that is comparable to the post–New Deal level.103
To the extent there was ever a meaningful shift in nondelegation
jurisprudence, it occurred not during the New Deal, but rather during the
Gilded Age.104 It was during that era that state and federal governments
expanded existing regulatory systems and relied increasingly on the expertise

100 See, e.g., Town of Godfrey v. City of Alton, 338 N.E.2d 890, 894–95 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975) (upholding a law that delegated to municipalities the authority to veto creation of
adjacent municipalities); State ex rel. Wagner v. St. Louis Cty. Port Auth., 604 S.W.2d 592,
598–601 (Mo. 1980) (upholding delegation to local port authorities of the power of
eminent domain).
101 See, e.g., Rogers v. Desiderio, 655 N.E.2d 930, 932–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding
that statute that permits voters to annex territory is not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power); Halmontaller v. City of Nashville, 332 S.W.2d 163, 164–66 (Tenn. 1960)
(invalidating a statute that delegated to voters the power to determine whether city
employees should have a five-day work week).
102 See, e.g., Atl. City Casino Ass’n v. City of Atlantic City, 525 A.2d 1109, 1114–15 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (sustaining a law that delegated to state treasurer the authority
to defer revaluation of real property for tax year).
103 See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 2, at 421.
104 See id. at 421–23.
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of executive agencies.105 Likewise, it was during that era that the most
notable changes in delegation challenges occurred.106
Although the powers and parties involved in nondelegation cases
remained broadly similar before and after the New Deal, the way in which
judges supported their decisions did change. Table 4 summarizes these
findings.
TABLE 4: CITED SUPPORT

Post–New Deal
Pre–New Deal

IN

COURT OPINIONS

Precedent

Constitution

Maxim

76%
57%

26%
22%

3%
22%

In the pre–New Deal era, it was common for judges to cite common law
maxims and inherited traditions to support their understanding of the
nondelegation doctrine. During this time, courts frequently invoked the
Latin maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari,107 and nondelegation maxims
of some kind made an appearance in twenty-two percent of the cases.108 Following the New Deal, however, this figure dropped to just three percent.
As appeals to maxims decreased, there was a corresponding increase in
citations to precedent (57% to 76%). Given that a number of salient
nondelegation cases were decided during the New Deal and that the body of
case law has grown much larger over the past eighty years, it is not surprising
that courts have increasingly relied upon precedent to justify their decisions.
The only mechanism of support that did not experience a notable change is
citations to constitutional text. In the pre–New Deal era, twenty-two percent
105 See id. at 421 (noting that “[t]he use of independent regulatory commissions and
other specialized, expert bureaucratic units was pioneered during the Gilded Age”); see also
JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3–25 (2012) (showing that the administrative state
has existed in a meaningful form since the founding).
106 See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 2, at 421–23.
107 See, e.g., Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112, 116 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851) (“[A legislator] cannot delegate to others the trust which has been expressly confided to him, by
reason of his supposed knowledge and sound judgment. Delegata potestas, non potest delegati,
is a settled maxim of the common law, in full force at the present day; and never more
applicable than to the case of a legislator.”); Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507, 515
(1847) (“Among the primal axioms of jurisprudence, political and municipal, is to be
found the principle that an agent, unless expressly empowered, cannot transfer his delegated authority to another, more especially when it rests in a confidence, partaking the
nature of a trust, and requiring for its due discharge, understanding, knowledge, and rectitude. The maxim is, delegata potestas non potest delegari.”).
108 See, e.g., People v. Fleming, 16 P. 298, 299 (Colo. 1887) (“One of the settled maxims
in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot
be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Slinger v. Henneman, 38 Wis. 504, 509–10 (1875) (“It is a settled maxim
of constitutional law, that the power thus conferred upon the legislature cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.”).
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of nondelegation cases referenced a specific constitutional provision. In the
post–New Deal era, this figure hardly budged, increasing just four percentage points.
C.

Representative Cases

Although aggregate statistics illuminate broader trends, they only tell
part of the story. In this final Section, we discuss individual nondelegation
cases that are representative of the entire sample. Of particular note is the
frequency with which judges addressed the same statutory delegations of
power and reached the same conclusions—even when decades, or an entire
century, separated the cases. In short, it is remarkable how little has changed
with the nondelegation doctrine over the course of its two-hundred-year
history.
One example of this continuity involves a line of cases addressing the
ability of the legislature to delegate professional licensing requirements. All
the way back in 1884, an Iowa state court upheld a statute that delegated the
authority to license pharmacists to a board of pharmacy.109 Four decades
later, in 1928, New York’s highest court rejected a nondelegation challenge
to a nearly identical statute that conferred the power to revoke pharmacists’
licenses upon an administrative board.110 Even more recently, in 1955, the
Supreme Court of Florida upheld a statute that authorized the American Veterinary Medical Association to set educational requirements for the licensing
of veterinarians.111 And, in 1975, a California court ruled that the legislature
could constitutionally delegate the power to set educational requirements for
the licensing of psychologists to a private accrediting agency.112 Nondelegation challenges against boards’ involvement in the licensing of professionals
have been common, and no less common has been willingness of courts to
uphold such delegations.
Another example concerns the limits of prosecutorial discretion. This
topic has long been a focus of nondelegation challenges. For instance, in
1924, a California court upheld a state law that gave prosecutors the ability to
determine whether a criminal’s second conviction for the unlawful possession of narcotics should be upgraded from a misdemeanor to a felony
offense.113 In 1975, an Illinois state court ruled that a prosecutor can constitutionally be delegated the authority to decide whether to charge an individual with a felony or misdemeanor.114 And, in 2005, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a nondelegation challenge to a three-strikes law that provided for
the possibility of life imprisonment in cases where the prosecutor chose to
109 See Hildreth v. Crawford, 21 N.W. 667, 669 (Iowa 1884).
110 See Mandel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 164 N.E. 895, 896–97 (N.Y.
1928).
111 See State ex rel. Kaplan v. Dee, 77 So. 2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1955).
112 See Packer v. Bd. of Behavioral Sci. Exam’rs, 125 Cal. Rptr. 96, 100 (Ct. App. 1975).
113 See People v. Mock Don Yuen, 227 P. 948, 949 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
114 See People v. Graham, 323 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
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file a notice with the court listing the prior convictions.115 Dozens of cases
have arisen with similar claims,116 and they all lead to the same outcome.
Invoking the nondelegation doctrine in an effort to limit prosecutorial discretion has been a universally unsuccessful strategy. Not all areas, however,
have received such unsympathetic treatment from the courts.
A final prominent example—and one in which the nondelegation doctrine has had considerable success over the years—deals with constraining
expansive delegations of the taxing power. Marr v. Enloe, a case we discussed
above,117 represents an early example of this type of unconstitutional delegation.118 In that 1830 case, the court struck down a Tennessee statute that
gave the judiciary the unlimited power to set taxes “upon all polls and property subject to taxation by the laws of this State.”119 Even for its time, this
delegation was notable, but more significant is the fact that some modern
legislatures still attempt to delegate broad taxing authority.
More than a hundred years after Marr v. Enloe, the North Dakota state
legislature delegated to the state’s Potato Development Commission the
authority to set the rate for an excise tax on potatoes and to determine, at its
complete discretion, which areas of the state shall be subject to the tax.120
Given the lack of guidance regarding the scope of the tax, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota held that the act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power.121
Similar delegations have been struck down even more recently. For
instance, in 1985, a Pennsylvania court ruled unconstitutional a municipal
delegation that authorized a Solid Waste Enforcement Officer to set garbage
rates “as he shall deem fair and reasonable.”122 And, in 2000, the Supreme
Court of Washington invalidated a statute that required “voter approval of all
future state and local tax increases.”123 As these representative lines of cases
115 See United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2005).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 936, 943 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
(rejecting an argument that the Federal Death Penalty Act violates the nondelegation doctrine because it allows the prosecution to designate additional nonstatutory aggravating
factors to be weighed by the jury in its death penalty determination); People v. Wright, 490
N.E.2d 640, 652 (Ill. 1985) (upholding law that gave State’s Attorney discretion over
whether to seek death penalty); Commonwealth v. Bannister, 497 A.2d 1362, 1365 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (ruling that the legislature did not “improperly delegate legislative power
to the executive by giving the prosecution discretion whether to invoke the Mandatory
Sentencing procedure”); Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 822–23 (Wyo. 1995) (upholding
statute that grants prosecutor the discretion to decide whether a juvenile over the age of
fourteen who is charged with a violent felony shall be tried as an adult).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 11–15.
118 See Marr v. Enloe, 9 Tenn. 452, 453 (1830).
119 Id.
120 See Scott v. Donnelly, 133 N.W.2d 418, 423–26 (N.D. 1965). The only limitation was
that the tax could not exceed a maximum rate specified by the statute. Id. at 425.
121 See id. at 426.
122 Meyersdale Borough Refuse Serv. v. Wentworth, 36 Pa. D. & C.3d 654, 657 (Ct. C.P.
1985).
123 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762, 772 (Wash. 2000).
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and the aggregate statistics both demonstrate, the New Deal was not a turning point for the nondelegation doctrine. Instead, consistency and stability
have been the hallmarks of the doctrine’s history.
CONCLUSION
Although more than two hundred years has elapsed since the first
nondelegation case,124 little has changed during that time. Today, the doctrine is invoked in the same disputes and implemented in the same manner
as it was in the nineteenth century. The narrative of decline that has dominated the past eighty years is wrong. The nondelegation doctrine did not die
during the New Deal but rather persists to this day.
In reaching this conclusion, we drew upon an original dataset of more
than one thousand nondelegation challenges. These cases revealed that the
pre– and post–New Deal nondelegation eras are characterized more by their
similarities than by their differences. With regard to the objects of delegation, the subjects of delegation, and even the invalidation rate, the two periods exhibit a remarkable degree of uniformity. Ultimately, the
nondelegation doctrine is notable not for its demise during the New Deal
revolution but rather for its surprising persistence through the twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries.

124

See Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493, 494 (Pa. 1799).
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